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DEEP FAKES, BOTS, AND SILOED JUSTICES: AMERICAN 
ELECTION LAW IN A “POST-TRUTH” WORLD 
RICHARD L. HASEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
About a decade or so ago, the major questions in the field of election law 
were familiar to scholars and centered on the Supreme Court: Would the 
Supreme Court overrule cases upholding limits on corporate and labor union 
campaign spending in candidate elections?1 Would the Court strike down a key 
provision of the Voting Rights Act requiring jurisdictions with a history of racial 
discrimination in voting to get federal approval before changing their voting 
rules?2 Would the Court rein in the use of strict voter identification laws, which 
(mostly Republican3) state legislatures imposed in the name of preventing voter 
fraud and promoting voter confidence, but that opponents believed were a means 
of suppressing the votes of those likely to vote for Democrats?  
We all know how the Court answered those questions, with controversial 
opinions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,4 striking down the 
corporate spending limits; Shelby County v. Holder,5 killing a key provision of 
 
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. An earlier version 
of this Essay was delivered as the Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture at St. Louis University 
School of Law, October 11, 2019. Thanks to Guy Charles, Justin Levitt, and Dan Tokaji, who 
offered thoughtful commentary on the lecture, to other symposium participants, and to Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Bobby Chesney, Howard Gillman, Rebecca Green, Rick Pildes, Song Richardson, 
Charlotte Stanton, Eugene Volokh, and Sonja West for useful comments and suggestions. 
 1. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (upholding key provisions 
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, more commonly known as the “McCain-Feingold” law, 
including those limiting corporate and union campaign spending on “electioneering 
communications”), overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 
365 (2010); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 669 (1990), overruled by 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). 
 2. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197–99 (2009) (questioning 
the constitutionality of the formula in Section 4(b) of Voting Rights Act determining which 
jurisdictions must obtain preclearance before making changes in their voting rules). 
 3. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS, 41–73 (2012). 
 4. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (holding unconstitutional under the First Amendment the 
federal ban on spending corporate treasury funds on certain campaign activity in federal elections). 
 5. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (striking down as unconstitutional 
under a principle of “equal sovereignty” the coverage formula contained in Section 4(b) of the 
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the Voting Rights Act; and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,6 
allowing Indiana to enforce its strict voter identification law. And while issues 
related to these cases continue to churn in the courts and remain of vital 
importance to American democracy,7 some of today’s most urgent election law 
questions seem fundamentally different and less Court-centric than those of the 
past, thanks to rapid technological change during a period of hyperpolarization 
that has called into question the ability of people to separate truth from falsity. 
These questions include: What can be done consistent with the First 
Amendment and without raising the risk of censorship to ensure that voters can 
make informed election decisions despite a flood of virally-spread false and 
misleading speech, audio, and images? How can the United States minimize 
foreign disinformation campaigns aimed at American elections and attempts to 
sow social discord via bot armies? How can voters obtain accurate information 
about who is trying to influence them via social media and other new forms of 
technology? How can we expect judges to evaluate contested voting rights 
claims when they, like others, may live in information cocoons in which the one-
sided media they consume affects their factual priors? Will voters on the losing 
end of a close election trust vote totals and election results announced by election 
officials when voters are bombarded with conspiracy theories about the 
reliability of voting technology and when foreign adversaries target voting 
systems to undermine confidence? 
This Essay considers election law in the post-truth era, one in which it has 
become increasingly difficult for voters to separate true from false information 
relevant to election campaigns. As I have explained elsewhere,8 rapid 
technological change and the rise of social media have upended the traditional 
 
Voting Rights Act). For a critique of this principle, see Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal 
Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2016). 
 6. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185, 189–89, 204 (2008) (rejecting 
facial constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause to Indiana’s strict voter 
identification law). 
 7. On campaign finance, for example, the Court continues to consider the constitutionality 
of other campaign finance limits in light of Citizens United. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 192 (2014). On voting rights, for example, courts continue to consider 
whether jurisdictions should be “bailed in” to preclearance under Section 3 of the Voting Rights 
Act. See Perez v. Abbott, 390 F. Supp. 3d 803, 807, 820 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (rejecting request to bail 
in Texas despite finding of intentional racial discrimination by the state). On voter identification 
laws, courts continue to struggle with whether strict voter identification laws violate Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 272 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (divided 
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc upholds district court finding that Texas voter identification law 
violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017); Veasey v. Abbott, 
888 F.3d 792, 795–96 (5th Cir. 2018) (divided Fifth Circuit panel rejects district court order 
enjoining Texas voter identification law based upon finding of racially discriminatory purpose in 
passing the law). 
 8. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200 (2018) [hereafter Hasen, Cheap Speech]. 
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media’s business model and radically changed how people communicate, 
educate, and persuade. The decline of the traditional media as information 
intermediaries has transformed—and coarsened—social and political 
communication, making it easier for misinformation and vitriol to spread. The 
result? Political campaigns that increasingly take place under conditions of voter 
mistrust and groupthink, with the potential for foreign interference and domestic 
political manipulation via new and increasingly sophisticated technological 
tools. Such dramatic changes raise deep questions about the conditions of 
electoral legitimacy and threaten to shake the foundation of democratic 
governance. 
Part II of this Essay briefly describes what I mean by the “post-truth” era in 
politics. Part III examines the effects of the post-truth era on campaign law, 
arguing for a new law requiring social media to label as “altered” synthetic 
media, including so-called “deep fakes.” I defend such a law as necessary to 
support the government’s compelling interest in assuring voters have access to 
truthful political information. Part IV considers campaign finance law, arguing 
for campaign disclosure laws requiring those who use online and social media 
to influence voters, including those using bots and other new technology, to 
disclose their true identities and the sources and amounts of their spending. Part 
V considers the difficulty of using courts to adjudicate voting rights claims when 
there is fundamental disagreement about the basic facts related to issues such as 
voter fraud in our hyperpolarized, cocooned political environment. The Essay 
concludes with some thoughts on whether election law is up to the task of 
dealing with technological change and polarization that threaten some of the key 
suppositions of how democracy is intended to function, including as an aid to 
the peaceful transition of power. 
II.  THE “POST-TRUTH” ERA IN POLITICS 
To start with definitions: When I say we are living in a “post-truth” era in 
the United States,9 I do not mean there is no such thing as objective truth. Far 
from it. I mean we are living in a time when there is fundamental disagreement 
among members of the public regarding basic facts about the state of the world, 
and there is no generally accepted arbiter whom a broad spectrum of the public 
will rely upon to resolve public factual disputes. Emotions often drive views 
 
 9. I do not mean to suggest that the post-truth era exists only in the United States. This may 
well be a more global phenomenon, but that question is beyond the scope of this Essay. Bobby 
Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and 
National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753, 1786 n.139 (2019) (“The Edelman Trust Barometer, 
which measures trust in institutions around the world, recorded a drop of nine points in the Trust 
Index for the United States from 2017 to 2018. Even among the informed public, the US dropped 
from a Trust Index of 68 to 45.”). See also Lori A. Ringhand, First Amendment 
(Un)Exceptionalism: A Comparative Taxonomy of Campaign Finance Reform Proposals in the US 
and UK (July 19, 2019) (unpublished draft) (on file with the author). 
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more than evidence,10 trust is in decline, and views commonly divide along 
partisan and ideological lines. Social media amplifies partisanship, raising 
emotions and concomitantly hardening positions about facts. And the public 
increasingly recognizes that “basic facts,” and not just opinion, are at stake.11 
For example, on climate change, a Pew Research Center survey found that 
“[t]hree-quarters of Democrats (including independents who lean to the 
Democratic Party) said in 2018 that the Earth is warming mostly due to human 
activity. In contrast, only about one-quarter of Republicans (26%, including 
leaners) said the same.”12 Further,  
[i]n 2016, 93% of Democrats (including leaners) with a high level of knowledge 
about science said climate change is mostly due to human activity, compared 
with 49% of Democrats with low science knowledge, based on a nine-item 
index. By contrast, Republicans and GOP-leaning independents with a high 
level of scientific knowledge were no more likely than those with a low level of 
knowledge to say climate change is mostly due to human activity.13 
On the question of Russian interference in the 2016 elections, a Washington 
Post-Schar School survey found that “[a]n 83 percent majority of Democrats say 
the Russian government tried to influence the election; a 54 percent majority of 
Republicans say Russia did not try to influence the vote.”14 And on immigration, 
42 percent of Republicans say that undocumented immigrants are more likely 
than U.S. citizens to commit serious crimes compared to 46 percent who say 
they are not.15 
The causes for the rise of the post-truth era are beyond the scope of this 
project. But roughly speaking, this era arose thanks to an unlucky confluence of 
 
 10. The Cambridge English Dictionary defines “post-truth” as “relating to a situation in which 
people are more likely to accept an argument based on their emotions and beliefs, rather than one 
based on facts.” Post-truth, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictio 
nary/english/post-truth [https://perma.cc/2NXM-54UM] (last visited July 3, 2019). 
 11. In Presidential Contest Voters Say ‘Basic Facts’ Not Just Policies Are in Dispute, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.people-press.org/2016/10/14/in-presidential-contest-voters 
-say-basic-facts-not-just-policies-are-in-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/S66J-XWPL]. 
 12. Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, How Americans See Climate Change in 5 Charts, FACT 
TANK, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/19/how-
americans-see-climate-change-in-5-charts/ [https://perma.cc/BZ3U-4F9A]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Scott Clement & Karoun Demirjian, Mueller Report Findings Upend Partisan Views of 
Probe Poll Finds, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
mueller-report-findings-upend-partisan-views-of-probe-poll-finds/2019/03/30/55058c98-51b2-11 
e9-88a1-ed346f0ec94f_story.html [https://perma.cc/6DNA-VFMK]. 
 15. Shifting Public Views on Legal Immigration into the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.people-press.org/2018/06/28/shifting-public-views-on-legal-immigration-into-the-
u-s/ [https://perma.cc/Y6FH-68CN]. For a summary of the empirical evidence on this question, see 
Robert Farley, Is Illegal Immigration Linked to More or Less Crime?, FACTCHECK.ORG (June 27, 
2018), https://www.factcheck.org/2018/06/is-illegal-immigration-linked-to-more-or-less-crime/ 
[https://perma.cc/V7Z5-422X]. 
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two different phenomena: the hyperpolarization of our politics,16 in which the 
two major political parties have become more homogenous and ideologically 
distinct along a liberal-conservative axis; and the decline in trusted 
intermediaries, especially the news media, who had helped people to separate 
truth from fiction. In Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American 
Democracy),17 I explain how technology’s transformation to allow cheap 
speech, such as social media posts, “usher[ed] in radical new opportunities for 
readers, viewers, and listeners to custom design what they read, see, and hear, 
while concomitantly undermining the power of intermediaries including 
publishers and bookstore owners.”18 But this transformation killed the 
economics of the traditional news media business, and despite the 
democratization of speech, the rise of cheap speech has had a definite dark side, 
with truth as one of the primary casualties: 
No doubt cheap speech has increased convenience, dramatically lowered the 
costs of obtaining information, and spurred the creation and consumption of 
content from radically diverse sources. But the economics of cheap speech also 
have undermined mediating and stabilizing institutions of American democracy 
including newspapers and political parties, with negative social and political 
consequences. In place of media scarcity, we now have a media fire hose which 
has diluted trusted sources of information and led to the rise of “fake news”—
falsehoods and propaganda spread by domestic and foreign sources for their own 
political and pecuniary purposes. The demise of local newspapers sets the stage 
for an increase in corruption among state and local officials. Rather than 
democratizing our politics, cheap speech appears to be hastening the irrelevancy 
of political parties by facilitating the ability of demagogues to secure support 
from voters by appealing directly to them, sometimes with incendiary appeals. 
Social media also can both increase intolerance and overcome collective action 
problems, both allowing for peaceful protest but also supercharging polarization 
and raising the dangers of violence in the United States.19 
The status of the news business has further deteriorated since I wrote the 
Cheap Speech article. Between January and May of 2019, approximately 3000 
American journalists were laid off or offered a buyout.20 These latest losses are 
on top of a tremendous decline in the industry as a whole, with journalism falling 
off twenty-three percent from 2008 to 2017,21 and by sixty-five percent looking 
 
 16. The best explanation for the causes of our current period of hyperpolarization appears in 
Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in 
America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273 (2011). 
 17. Hasen, Cheap Speech, supra note 8, at 201. 
 18. Id. at 200. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Gerry Smith, Journalism Job Cuts Haven’t Been This Bad Since the Recession, 
BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2019-07-01/journal 
ism-layoffs-are-at-the-highest-level-since-last-recession [https://perma.cc/C442-HR2B]. 
 21. Id. 
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over the last two decades.22 Indeed journalists have lost their jobs at a faster rate 
in that period than coal miners.23 
Social media and polarization act synergistically in a detrimental way. A 
recent experimental study by Michael Thaler found that people overestimate the 
truth of news reports that are in line with their preexisting beliefs, discount those 
that are contrary to those beliefs, and are overconfident in their ability to tell true 
from false statements.24 
Of course, the post-truth era creates many dangers for different aspects of 
society. For example, if enough people do not believe that humans caused 
climate change and need to fix it, there could be detrimental environmental 
consequences. The ability to spread false images of world leaders can imperil 
national security.25 
My focus here is on the serious implications of the post-truth era for 
elections and American democracy. Political science models do not expect 
voters to be busily studying policy all day, but they do posit that voters are able 
to have enough access to the truth via reliable shortcuts and intermediaries to 
figure out what is going on and to make decisions consistent with their 
interests.26 The post-truth era undermines that supposition for a vibrant 
democracy.27 
 
 22. John Bonazzo, Despite Trump Rhetoric Journalists Are Losing Jobs at a Faster Rate than 
Coal Miners, THE OBSERVER (Oct. 23, 2018), https://observer.com/2018/10/jobs-trump-coal-
miners-journalism/ [https://perma.cc/J7SQ-A67S]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Michael Thaler, The “Fake News” Effect: An Experiment on Motivated Reasoning and 
Trust in News 29 (Nov. 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://scholar.harvard.edu 
/files/mthaler/files/mthaler_fake-news-effect.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL7Y-U8V6] (“Subjects 
substantially over-trust Pro-Party news and Fake News in an environment with uninformative 
signals, real monetary stakes, and little room for self-deception. Furthermore, political partisans of 
all demographics engage in motivated reasoning, suggesting that this is a widespread bias. This 
bias leads to other errors and biases such as over-trust in Fake News, underperformance, and 
overconfidence.”). But see Katherine Clayton et al., Partisan Motivated Reasoning and 
Misinformation in the Media: Is News from Ideological Uncongenial Sources More Suspicious?, 
JAPANESE J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/japanese-journal-
of-political-science/article/partisan-motivated-reasoning-and-misinformation-in-the-media-is-
news-from-ideologically-uncongenial-sources-more-suspicious/BCD0B8E0558FD72E8A3E093 
1FCB4E35A# [https://perma.cc/FZL9-7S39] (finding that people tend to believe false information 
when they are exposed to it, regardless of whether it is from an ideologically compatible source). 
 25. Chesney & Citron, supra note 9, at 1783. 
 26. Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Why Are American Campaign Polls So Variable When 
Votes are So Predictable?, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 409 (1993) (positing that during the campaign 
period, voters receiving information through the media helps them to make decisions consistent 
with their enlightened self-interest). For a brief review of the literature on how campaigns affect 
voter choice, see DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 674–
79 (6th ed. 2017). 
 27. See Nathaniel Persily, The Internet’s Challenge to Democracy: Framing the Problem and 
Assessing Reform 22–23 (2019), available at https://storage.googleapis.com/kofiannanfoundation. 
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And so, I now turn to my key question: What, if anything, can and should 
election law do to ameliorate the problems for American democracy caused by 
the post-truth era? 
III.  CAMPAIGN LAW 
It was the ultimate October surprise, actually back-to-back surprises, in the 
2016 presidential election between Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and 
Republican candidate Donald Trump. On October 7, 2016, the Washington Post 
revealed the “Access Hollywood” tape. The Post described the leaked video as 
one in which  
Donald Trump bragged in vulgar terms about kissing, groping and trying to have 
sex with women during a 2005 conversation caught on a hot microphone, saying 
that “when you’re a star, they let you do it.” The video captures Trump talking 
with Billy Bush, then of “Access Hollywood,” on a bus with the show’s name 
written across the side. They were arriving on the set of “Days of Our Lives” to 
tape a segment about Trump’s cameo on the soap opera.28 
The video led to immediate condemnation from people across the political 
spectrum and predictions of the Trump campaign’s collapse. Yet the campaign 
did not collapse. One reason for Trump’s survival may have been what came 
right after the tape leaked. According to Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s 
investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 elections, “[l]ess than an hour 
after the video’s publication, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by 
[agents of a Russian army unit known as] the GRU from the account of Clinton 
campaign chairman John Podesta.”29 After embarrassing material surfaced in 
the Podesta emails and from other stolen materials, Trump went on to narrowly 
beat Clinton in the election. 
Trump was “extremely upset” about the “Access Hollywood” tape, 
according to his former aide, Hope Hicks.30 And yet after issuing a rare apology 
 
org/2019/02/a6112278-190206_kaf_democracy_internet_persily_single_pages_v3.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/A97Z-72PX]. 
 28. David A. Farenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation About 
Women in 2005, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-
recorded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in-2005/2016/10/07/3b9ce776-8cb 
4-11e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html?utm_term=.13108edfa3b6 [https://perma.cc/W2RP-TQ 
TQ]. (The most salacious comments in the conversation between Trump and “Access Hollywood” 
host Billy Bush included: “And when you’re a star, they let you do it,” Trump says. “You can do 
anything.” “Whatever you want,” says another voice, apparently Bush’s. “Grab them by the p—-
y,” Trump says. “You can do anything.”) 
 29. SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO 
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 58 (Mar. 2019) (hereafter, 
MUELLER REPORT). 
 30. Id. at 79 (“The President then told Sessions he should resign as Attorney General. Sessions 
agreed to submit his resignation and left the Oval Office. Hicks saw the President shortly after 
Sessions departed and described the President as being extremely upset by the Special Counsel’s 
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one day following the video’s release,31 Trump did something 
extraordinaryhe suggested the video was fake. The New York Times reported 
that Trump told a senator and an advisor a year after his apology that the tape 
was not authentic, further telling the senator that he was looking to hire someone 
to ascertain whether or not it was his voice on the tape.32  
It is hard to know if anyone who was paying attention to the controversy 
believed Trump’s denials: after all, people know what they saw and heard. Even 
Trump’s press secretary at the time, Sarah Sanders, would not weigh in to defend 
him.33 However, there is good reason to believe that future candidates in 
Trump’s position will be luckier. 
As technology improves, it is quickly getting easier, even for those without 
great technical sophistication, to use artificial intelligence technology to create 
synthetic media (more commonly known as “deep fakes”). Such audio and video 
clips can be manipulated using machine learning and artificial intelligence and 
can make a politician, celebrity, or anyone else appear to say or do anything that 
the manipulator wants.34 Within a few years, any politician could be made to 
 
appointment. Hicks said that she had only seen the President like that one other time, when the 
Access Hollywood tape came out during the campaign.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 31. Chris Cillizza, Here’s What Donald Trump Really Meant When He Apologized Friday 
Night, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/08/ 
donald-trump-finally-apologized-for-his-lewd-remarks-here-it-is/?utm_term=.66b03fc19d38 
[https://perma.cc/G8W2-83D2] (“I’ve never said I’m a perfect person, nor pretended to be someone 
that I’m not. I’ve said and done things I regret, and the words released today on this more than a 
decade old video are one of them. Anyone who knows me knows these words don’t reflect who I 
am. I said it, I was wrong, and I apologize.”). 
 32. Emily Stewart, Trump Has Started Suggesting The Access Hollywood Tape is Fake. It’s 
Not, VOX (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/11/28/16710130/trump-
says-access-hollywood-tape-fake [https://perma.cc/L5T4-26GN]; Jonathan Martin, Maggie 
Haberman, and Alexander Burns, Why Trump Stands by Roy Moore, Even as It Fractures His 
Party, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/us/politics/trump-roy-
moore-mcconnell-alabama-senate.html [https://perma.cc/UDS9-RSC9]. Trump apparently has 
never publicly made the claim that the tape was fake. 
 33. Stewart, supra note 32 (quoting Sarah Sanders: “Look, the president addressed this. This 
was litigated and certainly answered during the election by the overwhelming support for the 
president and the fact that he’s sitting here in the Oval Office today.”). 
 34. Chesney & Citron, supra note 9, at 1758 (explaining that deep fake technology “leverages 
machine-learning algorithms to insert faces and voices into video and audio recordings of actual 
people and enables the creation of realistic impersonations out of digital whole-cloth. The end result 
is realistic-looking video or audio making it appear that someone said or did something. Although 
deep fakes can be created with the consent of people being featured, more often they will be created 
without it.”); see also CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, SUMMARY OF JUNE 19TH 
MEETING ON SAFEGUARDING THE U.S. 2020 ELECTION FROM SYNTHETIC AND MANIPULATED 
MEDIA n.1 (July 2019) (on file with the author) (“We define synthetic media as audio, video, or 
image generated with artificial intelligence that depicts someone saying or doing something they 
neither said nor did. Manipulated media is audio, video, or image that depicts someone saying or 
doing something they neither said nor did without the aid of artificial intelligence.”); Rebecca 
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appear to say the odious words on the “Access Hollywood” tape, and that content 
could spread virally via Facebook, Twitter, and other social media. We will no 
longer be able to trust what we see and hear. 
As Professor Brendan Nyhan has argued,35 the primary danger of current 
(lower-tech-driven) misinformation spread via social media is not that people 
will necessarily believe false information and make decisions based upon it; but 
that people will discount the veracity of all information based on the potential 
for it to be false.36 This trend will likely only increase as deep fakes improve in 
technical sophistication and it becomes harder for humans to differentiate true 
from false images without technical help. The effect also seems likely to be more 
pronounced among younger people, who are more prone to be suspect of the 
veracity of content.37 Nyhan also worries that false videos might have more 
serious effects than false written statements given how human cognition 
works.38 
The situation with synthetic media creates something akin to what Nobel 
Prize-winning economist George Akerlof described as the “market for lemons” 
effect.39 Akerlof’s theory explained problems with the proper functioning of a 
market for used cars, when people have a difficult time differentiating between 
a good used car and a bad oneor a “lemon.” In the market, good used cars are 
less likely to remain for sale because everyone discounts what they will pay for 
a used car by the chances that it is a lemon. This information problem creates a 
spiraling down effect, where people with good used cars take them off the 
 
Green, Counterfeit Campaign Speech, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1445, 1447–48 (2019) (using label of 
“counterfeit” campaign speech for “a faked version of the real thing fabricated with the intent to 
deceive”). 
 35. Brendan Nyhan, Why Fears of Fake News Are Overhyped, MEDIUM (Feb. 4, 2018), 
https://medium.com/s/reasonable-doubt/why-fears-of-fake-news-are-overhyped-2ed9ca0a52c9 
[https://perma.cc/V877-RKCD]; see also Andrew Guess et al., Selective Exposure to 
Misinformation: Evidence From the Consumption of Fake News During the 2016 Presidential 
Campaign, EUR. RES. COUNCIL (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news 
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G8D-HAXN]. 
 36. Max Read, Can You Spot a Deepfake? Does It Matter?, N.Y. MAG. (June 27, 2019), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/06/how-do-you-spot-a-deepfake-it-might-not-matter.html 
[https://perma.cc/MT4P-539R] (“If you want a vision of the future, don’t imagine an onslaught of 
fake video. Imagine an onslaught of commenters calling every video fake.”). 
 37. Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Media Trust Continues to Recover from 2016 Low, GALLUP (Oct. 
12, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/243665/media-trust-continues-recover-2016-low.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/BJ45-PP7Q] (“53% of those aged 65 and older trust in the media, compared with 
just 33% of those under age 30. Younger adults have come of an age in an era marked by partisan 
media and fake news, while older Americans’ trust may have been established long ago in an era 
of widely read daily newspapers and trusted television news anchors.”). 
 38. Nyhan, supra note 35. 
 39. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489 (Aug. 1970). 
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market because the price is too low, leading to more lemons on the market and 
greater depression of the price.  
Here too, the market for information from reputable news organizations will 
suffer with the flood of plausible fake information: bad information crowds out 
the good information as people are willing to pay less for all information given 
the increased chances of receiving false information.40  
Further, the proliferation of artificial intelligence-generated deep fakes 
would allow a future Donald Trump to take advantage of what Professors Bobby 
Chesney and Danielle Citron have called the “Liar’s Dividend”: the decreasing 
possibility that any image of a politician or celebrity is genuine “makes it easier 
for liars to avoid accountability for things that are in fact true.”41 As Trump has 
said in the context of sexual harassment allegations, the strategy is “deny, deny, 
deny.”42 Denial becomes easier as bad information increasingly floods the 
market. 
Social media platforms do not yet know how to deal with the arrival of deep 
fakes. Facebook flags some ordinary misinformation (such as a post falsely 
stating that President Obama was born in Kenya) as false, and sometimes the 
company demotes posts containing misinformation in users’ feeds and makes 
fact check information available to those who click on links flagged as 
containing false information.43 However, Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook founder 
and CEO, told an audience at the Aspen Ideas Festival in the summer of 2019 
that perhaps the company should treat deep fakes differently from regular 
misinformation. He gave no indication as to the precise nature of the different 
handling, other than to say that the company was “evaluating” the issue. 
Elsewhere in the interview, Zuckerberg suggested government action and 
 
 40. The rise of used car intermediaries such as CarMax and the cheaper spread of information 
over the internet have somewhat solved the market failure for used cars. But we have not yet seen 
a market solution to deal with problems of the easy spread of misinformation. 
 41. Chesney & Citron, supra note 9, at 1758; see also Samantha Cole, We Are Truly Fucked: 
Everyone Is Making AI-Generated Fake Porn Now, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 24, 2018), https://mother 
board.vice.com/en_us/article/bjye8a/reddit-fake-porn-app-daisy-ridley [https://perma.cc/RN69-U 
97V]. 
 42. Maya Openheim, Donald Trump Says ‘You’ve Got to Deny’ Accusations by Women, 
According to Bob Woodward Book, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.indepen 
dent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-women-bob-woodward-deny-sexual-assault-
stormy-daniels-book-fear-a8534061.html [https://perma.cc/G4TM-XEM7] (“‘You’ve got to deny, 
deny, deny and push back on these women,’ Mr. Trump said, according to Mr. Woodward. ‘If you 
admit to anything and any culpability, then you’re dead. That was a big mistake you made.’”). 
 43. See Daniel Funke, In the Past Year Facebook Has Quadrupled Its Fact Checking Partners, 
POYNTER (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2019/in-the-past-year-facebook 
-has-quadrupled-its-fact-checking-partners/ [https://perma.cc/57JU-7ZDU]. 
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regulation may be the answer to some of the company’s problems with attempted 
political manipulation on the company’s platforms.44  
Does election law provide an avenue for preventing the erosion of truth 
through misinformation and synthetic media? The question is urgent given that 
about three-quarters of Americans in a recent survey favored steps to restrict 
altered videos and images, with Democrats and Republicans similarly 
supporting restrictions over freedom to publish such images.45 
 I begin with the idea that any law purporting to regulate the content of media 
being used for political communications would be subject to heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny,46 either strict scrutiny in which the government would 
have to show that any regulation satisfied a compelling interest and that the 
means adopted were narrowly tailored to that interest, or some intermediate level 
of scrutiny. For this reason, there are limits to how much the law can help to 
solve these problems with our democracy. 
The compelling interest portion of the argument for regulation of false 
media is surprisingly easy to make. Courts should recognize that the government 
has a compelling interest in assuring that voters have access to truthful political 
information and to the tools to discover its truth or falsity. The Supreme Court 
has long recognized the value of an “active, alert” citizenry,47 and democracy 
depends upon voters’ ability to evaluate arguments in order to make political 
and electoral decisions. As the Supreme Court stated in Citizens United, quoting 
 
 44. Barbara Ortutay, Zuckerberg Says Company Evaluating ‘Deep Fake’ Policy, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (June 26, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/506bfacda55540e1921a2dd101926fdf 
[https://perma.cc/3E99-F89J]. The video of the portion of the exchange about deep fakes begins at 
16:10 here: https://www.aspenideas.org/sessions/mark-zuckerberg-at-aspen-ideas-festival-2019 
[https://perma.cc/RX48-3A7Y]. 
 45. Jeffrey Gottfried, About Three-Quarters of Americans Favor Steps to Restrict Altered 
Videos and Images, PEW RES. CTR. (June 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019 
/06/14/about-three-quarters-of-americans-favor-steps-to-restrict-altered-videos-and-images/ 
[https://perma.cc/G24M-UKUN]. 
 46. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015) (“it is well established that the First 
Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular 
viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.”); commercial speech is 
subject to an intermediate standard of scrutiny, and here government efforts to require business 
entities to tell the truth are likely on firmer constitutional footing. CTIA v. City of Berkeley, 928 
F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 658 (2019) (“Under Zauderer [v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)] as we interpret it today, 
the government may compel truthful disclosure in commercial speech as long as the compelled 
disclosure is reasonably related to a substantial governmental interest, and involves ‘purely factual 
and uncontroversial information’ that relates to the service or product provided.”) (cleaned up); see 
also infra footnotes 75–80 and accompanying text (considering the reach of Zauderer). 
 47. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768–69 (1978) (“Preserving the integrity 
of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and sustaining the active, alert responsibility of the 
individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government are interests of the highest 
importance”) (cleaned up). 
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its seminal 1976 campaign finance decision, Buckley v. Valeo, “[i]n a republic 
where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed 
choices among candidates for office is essential.”48 Further, the Court in New 
York Times v. Sullivan49 famously held that the state can punish those who 
engage in false, defamatory speech made with actual malice. 
The problem with a law regulating deep fakes or other false information 
instead is one of the means to achieve the compelling interest. There is no easy 
way for the government to define what counts as truthful political information, 
and the process of mandating that the government police truth and falsity raises 
dangers of viewpoint discrimination and government manipulation. Again, we 
need look no further than President Trump, who routinely labels reporting he 
does not like as “fake news,”50 even when the reporting follows ordinary 
journalistic standards and reasonable observers believe it to contain only truthful 
information. Any government agency charged with separating true from false 
information that is under the control of a Trump-like leader could manipulate 
the process of declaring falsity. The cure would be worse than the disease.  
However, this does not mean that all regulation to help voters discern truth 
from lies is unconstitutional. The matter is complicated and gets us into a tangle 
of some First Amendment doctrines.  
To begin with, the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on laws regulating 
synthetic media created to influence elections or politics. The Court has, 
however, moved from a position that false political speech made with actual 
malice can be penalized toward a position very skeptical of such laws. In a 1982 
case, Brown v. Hartlage,51 the Court rejected an attempt to declare an election 
result void after the winner was accused of violating a Kentucky law that barred 
a candidate from certain corrupt practices.52 The candidate had promised not to 
take a salary if elected and Kentucky courts had previously held that promises 
not to take a salary violated the statute and could be grounds for voiding the 
election.53 In the course of holding the Kentucky law unconstitutional, the Court 
in dicta stated that “demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the First 
Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.”54 
 
 48. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976)). 
 49. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
 50. Hasen, Cheap Speech, supra note 8, at 208. 
 51. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 58 (1982). The discussion in the next few paragraphs 
draws from Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74 
MONT. L. REV. 53, 58, 65–68 (2013). 
 52. Brown, 456 U.S. at 58. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 60. The statement was dicta because there was no evidence in this case that the 
candidate made the statement in anything other than good faith. 
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By 2012, however, the Court appeared to have shifted its view on the 
protection of false political speech. It strongly suggested in United States v. 
Alvarez,55 a case involving a person who lied about receiving a Medal of Valor 
for bravery in combat, that laws penalizing false political speech would violate 
the First Amendment. 
There was no majority opinion. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion for four 
Justices rejected the argument that the First Amendment categorically does not 
protect false statements, just as the First Amendment categorically does not 
protect other types of speech, such as obscenity and fighting words.56 He wrote 
that “counterspeech” is normally the constitutionally acceptable response to 
false political speech and that the Stolen Valor Act violated the First 
Amendment.57 Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion for himself and Justice 
Kagan, applied intermediate scrutiny in agreeing the Stolen Valor Act was 
unconstitutional.58 Importantly, Justice Breyer recognized that laws punishing 
false political speech raised difficult questions of balancing, and that 
counterspeech was the usual appropriate remedy.59  
Even Justice Alito, dissenting on the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor 
law, argued that  
there are broad areas in which any attempt by the state to penalize purportedly 
false speech would present a grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing 
 
 55. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 713, 729–30 (2012). 
 56. Id. at 720–22. 
 57. Id. at 726–27. 
 58. Id. at 730 (Breyer, J. concurring in the judgment). 
 59. Justice Breyer wrote: 
I recognize that in some contexts, particularly political contexts, such a narrowing will not 
always be easy to achieve. In the political arena a false statement is more likely to make a 
behavioral difference (say, by leading the listeners to vote for the speaker) but at the same 
time criminal prosecution is particularly dangerous (say, by radically changing a potential 
election result) and consequently can more easily result in censorship of speakers and their 
ideas. Thus, the statute may have to be significantly narrowed in its applications. Some 
lower courts have upheld the constitutionality of roughly comparable but narrowly tailored 
statutes in political contexts. See, e.g., United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, 
America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 93 (C.A.2 1997) (upholding against First Amendment 
challenge application of Lanham Act to a political organization); Treasurer of the 
Committee to Elect Gerald D. Lostracco v. Fox, 150 Mich. App. 617, 389 N.W.2d 446 
(1986) (upholding under First Amendment statute prohibiting campaign material falsely 
claiming that one is an incumbent). Without expressing any view on the validity of those 
cases, I would also note, like the plurality, that in this area more accurate information will 
normally counteract the lie. And an accurate, publicly available register of military awards, 
easily obtainable by political opponents, may well adequately protect the integrity of an 
award against those who would falsely claim to have earned it. And so it is likely that a 
more narrowly tailored statute combined with such information-disseminating devices will 
effectively serve Congress’ end. 
Id. at 738 (citation omitted). 
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truthful speech. Laws restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, 
history, the social sciences, the arts, and other matters of public concern would 
present such a threat. The point is not that there is no such thing as truth or falsity 
in these areas or that the truth is always impossible to ascertain, but rather that 
it is perilous to permit the state to be the arbiter of truth . . . .60 
Putting the three Alvarez opinions together, we see a Court unanimously 
expressing deep skepticism of laws penalizing false speech in political 
campaigns. Despite Alvarez, however, the Court has left room for some 
regulation in related areas.  
First, the government likely could prohibit what I will term false election 
speech, which is false speech about the mechanics of voting. In Minnesota 
Voters Alliance v. Mansky,61 the Court acknowledged that the government could 
ban false speech about when and how to vote, such as false speech directing 
people to the wrong polling place, at least in a nonpublic forum like a polling 
place. Under Mansky, the government may punish those who engage in such 
speech. Such speech does not raise the risk of the state having to make judgment 
calls about truth or falsity. For example, the location of a polling place is 
objectively verifiable. 
Further, although Mansky did not reach the issue, the government likely 
could require websites and platforms with large numbers of users, such as major 
social media companies, to remove false election speech from their sites.62 Such 
regulation does not raise the risk of censoring controversial political ideas. If the 
law mandates that voting take place on Tuesday, a false social media post saying 
“Democrats vote on Wednesday” is demonstrably false and requires no value 
judgment on behalf of a government regulator and raises no issues of 
ambiguity.63  
 
 60. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 751–52 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 61. Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1889 n.4 (2018) (“We do not doubt 
that the State may prohibit messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and 
procedures.”). 
 62. The limitation to websites with large numbers of users is meant to limit the burden of such 
a law on those who are engaged in personal expression without much societal impact. 
 63. Such a law may not even be subject to strict scrutiny under Alvarez, which leaves uncertain 
the level of First Amendment protection that applies to knowing falsehoods. A law that would go 
further and prohibit “misleading” campaign speech is more problematic despite Mansky’s reference 
to “messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and procedures.” Consider a 
flyer which was distributed some years ago in University of Wisconsin dormitories telling voters 
to vote “at the polling place of your choice.” See HASEN, supra note 3, at 94 (containing an example 
of such a flyer). A vote cast anywhere but in the voter’s actual voting place would be a provisional 
ballot which would not count. The statement is misleading but it does not contain a falsity, and it 
may be impossible to write a law that would allow for this policing without raising a risk of political 
censorship. Professor Green argues for a narrower scope for regulation, only those featuring the 
names or likenesses of candidates. “Other counterfeits—like a fabricated video of a riot, faked 
evidence of a ‘crisis actor’ in a school shooting, or a doctored image of an immigrant toddler—
even if attempting to distort an electoral result, would not be implicated. Counterfeit speech relating 
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A law requiring companies to remove such content would be supported by 
the same compelling interest the Court implicitly recognized in Mansky: the 
protection of the integrity of the voting process. And while such a law would 
reach into the private property of websites, it is less intrusive than laws which 
prohibit other unprotected speech on private property, such as laws banning 
obscenity, and supported by a truly compelling state interest in assuring that 
voters have accurate information about how to participate in a democracy.64  
Second, nothing would prevent a government agency from declaring what 
is true or false about elections, politics, and policy, and then voters could take 
that information for what it is worth: a credible government agency is likely to 
be believed, while an agency headed by a charlatan yelling “fake news” would 
be less likely to be believed. Under the government speech doctrine, as the 
Supreme Court recognized recently in Matal v. Tam, “[w]hen a government 
entity embarks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint 
and rejects others. The Free Speech Clause does not require government to 
maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers and employees speak about that 
venture.”65 
Third, the government likely has the power under the Constitution to 
mandate a truth-in-labeling law requiring social media platforms and other 
websites with large numbers of users to deploy the best reasonably available 
technology to label synthetic media containing altered video and audio images 
as “altered.” The technology to detect the most sophisticated deep fakes is not 
there yet,66 but with the investment of significant resources—which are in the 
country’s national security interest to develop quickly67—adequate means to 
ferret out when someone has posted altered media may well be on the way.68 
 
to policy issues would also be excluded from the proposed prohibition.” Green, supra note 34, at 
1451. 
 64. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (“these areas of speech can, 
consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable 
content [obscenity, defamation, etc.]”). 
 65. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017). 
 66. Chesney & Citron, supra note 9, at 1787 (expressing skepticism of a technological solution 
in the short term); Evan Halper, ‘Deep Fakes’ Video Could Upend an Election—But Silicon Valley 
Could Have a Way to Combat Them, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/poli 
tics/story/2019-11-05/deep-fakes-2020-election-silicon-valley-cure [https://perma.cc/A9FV-AE 
97]. The “best reasonably available technology” standard would have to be developed, perhaps via 
Federal Trade Commission regulations, taking into account the cost and efficacy of such 
technology. Similarly, regulation would have to specify what counts as an alteration of a video. 
The regulation would exclude from those videos requiring the “altered” label those videos which 
used commercially ordinary cropping and color correction, for example. 
 67. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 9, at 1784 (discussing dire national security implications 
of deep fakes). 
 68. Drew Harwell, White House Shares Doctored Video to Support Punishment of Journalist 
Jim Acosta, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/11/ 
08/white-house-shares-doctored-video-support-punishment-journalist-jim-acosta/?utm_term=.60 
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As detection technology continues to develop, a truth-in-labeling regime 
should be the top way to deal with the deep fake problem and is supported by 
the government’s interest in preventing consumer and voter deception. Such 
labeling would help solve the market-for-lemons problem, at least with respect 
to doctored audio and video. The market for lemons in the used car market arose 
because consumers do not have adequate tools to separate good used cars from 
lemons. Just like a law that would require sellers of used cars to disclose earlier 
problems with a car (akin to “show me the Carfax”69), a labeling law requiring 
social media platforms to label video and audio as altered would help cure the 
market failure. Viewers would become more confident that the videos they 
observed or audio they heard were genuine and not a “lemon” when the media 
arrived into their feed without a label indicating alteration. 
Such a truth-in-labeling requirement would be viewpoint neutral, and it 
would not enmesh the government or websites in the difficult business of 
determining what is legitimate satire. Media altered for satirical purposes, for 
example, would be labeled just the same way as that manipulated for malicious 
reasons. The labeling will not interfere with any satiric purpose.70 
Nor would such a law run afoul of prohibitions on certain forms of 
compelled speech. In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. 
 
1cddabc808 [https://perma.cc/KA6R-GPU7]. In the meantime, there often will be adequate proof 
that a particular audio or video of an elected official, candidate, or other public figure has been 
altered, and that the media portrayal is not a truthful representation. One recent such example where 
a fraud was quickly uncovered with conventional technology involved CNN reporter Jim Acosta. 
As the Washington Post reported: 
  White House press secretary Sarah Sanders on Wednesday night shared a video of 
CNN reporter Jim Acosta that appeared to have been altered to make his actions at a news 
conference look more aggressive toward a White House intern. 
  The edited video looks authentic: Acosta appeared to swiftly chop down on the arm of 
an aide as he held onto a microphone while questioning President Trump. But in the original 
video, Acosta’s arm appears to move only as a response to a tussle for the microphone. His 
statement, “Pardon me, ma’am,” is not included in the video Sanders shared. 
  Critics said that video—which sped up the movement of Acosta’s arms in a way that 
dramatically changed the journalist’s response—was deceptively edited to score political 
points. That edited video was first shared by Paul Joseph Watson, known for his conspiracy-
theory videos on the far-right website Infowars. 
Id. 
 69. Press Release, Carfax, ‘Show Me the Carfax Campaign’ Wins Coveted Effie Award (June 
16, 2011), https://www.carfax.com/press/show-me-the-carfax-campaign-wins-coveted-effie-
award [https://perma.cc/97LH-846A] (“Carfax and its partner Zimmerman Advertising have 
received a Silver Effie Award for the ‘Show Me the Carfax’ national advertising campaign. The 
two companies collaborated on the campaign that helps consumers buy used cars with more 
confidence and shop at dealerships that provide Carfax Vehicle History Reports for the cars they 
sell.”). 
 70. Such a law could exempt from coverage certain technical minor alterations, such as color 
correction of video content. 
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Becerra,71 the Supreme Court struck down two California laws requiring certain 
“crisis pregnancy centers” to give notices to clients about the availability of 
publicly funded family planning services, including abortion and contraception. 
The Court held that such disclosures were a form of compelled speech on a 
controversial topic that were not justified under even intermediate scrutiny. It 
held that the law was underinclusive in providing information about state-
sponsored services to low-income women.72 And it held that California could 
have provided the information to California women directly without burdening 
the centers.73  
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court reaffirmed that the 
government could mandate “purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures 
about commercial products.”74 It pointed to its earlier decision in Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio75 upholding an Ohio 
law requiring attorneys who advertised contingency fee services to disclose that 
clients may have to pay certain fees and costs.76  
The Court described Zauderer as an illustration of the Court applying a 
lower level of scrutiny of compelled disclosure in certain contexts, and it 
stressed the commercial, factual context of permissible disclosures: “Noting that 
the disclosure requirement governed only ‘commercial advertising’ and required 
the disclosure of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms 
under which . . . services will be available,’ the Court explained that such 
requirements should be upheld unless they are ‘unjustified or unduly 
burdensome.’”77 Lower courts have read Zauderer as at least applying to 
disclosures aimed at preventing consumer deception, if not going even further 
to allow the government to mandate further factual and uncontroversial 
disclosures.78 
A requirement that websites and social media platforms with large number 
of users label altered videos as “altered” would mandate the disclosure of purely 
factual and uncontroversial information in a commercial context.79 It would not 
require the websites to make value judgments about the reasons for the alteration 
 
 71. Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018). 
 72. Id. at 2375–76. 
 73. Id. at 2376. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 629 
(1985). 
 76. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 77. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
 78. Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 394 & nn.194–95 
(2018). See also id. at 380 (reading a line of Supreme Court cases to “suggest[] that perhaps pure 
compulsions to convey facts are generally permissible”). 
 79. That people post on social media for political purposes does not negate the essentially 
commercial nature of enterprises such as Facebook and Twitter. 
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and it would be something that is objectively verifiable. It would protect 
consumers and voters from deception. 
My proposal for truth in labeling of deep fakes stands a greater chance of 
being held constitutional than laws that would punish deep fakes or require their 
removal from websites and social media platforms. For example, a recently 
enacted California law (in effect only until January 1, 2023) makes it illegal for 
anyone “within 60 days of an election at which a candidate for elective office 
will appear on the ballot, [to] distribute, with actual malice, materially deceptive 
audio or visual media . . . of the candidate with the intent to injure the 
candidate’s reputation or to deceive a voter into voting for or against the 
candidate” unless the video or audio was labeled as “manipulated.”80 The bill 
contains exemptions for the news media and for “satire or parody.”81 The law 
allows a candidate injured by a deep fake to obtain an injunction and damages 
in appropriate cases.82 
The California law, which was inspired by a crudely altered 2019 video 
(sometimes referred to as a “cheap fake”83) making it appear that House Speaker 
Nancy Pelosi was drunk at a press conference,84 presents greater constitutional 
problems both because of its wider breadth and its pejorative labeling. 
Among other things, a law banning deep fakes raises vagueness and 
overbreadth problems by preventing the use of synthetic media when one is 
reckless about distributing “deceptive” video or audio about a candidate to a 
voter. It is not clear how to define what counts as “parody or satire” under the 
 
 80. Cal. Leg. AB 730 (2019-2020) Regular Session, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/bill 
TextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB730 [https://perma.cc/8QF6-RFG6], amended California 
Elections Code Section 20010 until 2023. The quoted language appears in section 20010(a). The 
new section 20010(e) defines “deceptive audio or visual media” as 
an image or an audio or video recording of a candidate’s appearance, speech, or conduct 
that has been intentionally manipulated in a manner such that both of the following 
conditions are met: 
(1) The image or audio or video recording would falsely appear to a reasonable person to 
be authentic. 
(2) The image or audio or video recording would cause a reasonable person to have a 
fundamentally different understanding or impression of the expressive content of the image 
or audio or video recording than that person would have if the person were hearing or seeing 
the unaltered, original version of the image or audio or video recording. 
Id. 
 81. Id. § (d)(5). 
 82. Id. §§ (c)(1), (c)(2). 
 83. On the difference between deep fakes and cheap fakes, see Dan Patterson, From Deepfake 
to “Cheap Fake,” It’s Getting Harder to Tell What’s True on Your Favorite Apps and Websites, 
CBS NEWS (June 13, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-are-deepfakes-how-to-tell-if-
video-is-fake/ [https://perma.cc/3E3D-WZGZ]. 
 84. Andrew Sheeler, California is Moving to Ban Deepfakes. What Are They, Anyway?, THE 
SACRAMENTO BEE (July 2, 2019), www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/arti 
cle232162032.html [https://perma.cc/F4M5-QH8S]. 
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law’s safe harbor, and how to tell whether someone who is intending to influence 
an election using manipulated media engaged in an act of deception.  
Further, the label “manipulated” is more pejorative than “altered,” and that 
too may raise a constitutional issue because the government would be putting a 
negative label on political speech. In Cook v. Gralike,85 the Court considered the 
constitutionality under the Qualifications Clause of a proposed “Scarlet Letter” 
ballot provision requiring state officials to label some congressional candidates 
on the ballot as having “disregarded” or “declined” voter instructions on term 
limits. The Court rejected the requirement, in part based upon the pejorative 
nature of the ballot descriptions: “In describing the two labels, the courts below 
have employed terms such as ‘pejorative,’ ‘negative,’ ‘derogatory,’ 
‘intentionally intimidating,’ ‘particularly harmful,’ ‘politically damaging,’ ‘a 
serious sanction,’ ‘a penalty,’ and ‘official denunciation.’”86 
Unlike the California law, a truth-in-labeling requirement is not government 
censorship, because it stops no one from being able to create and post whatever 
altered video they like.87 It does not pejoratively label the material as 
“manipulated.” It raises no issues of prior restraint of speech as the California 
law may raise through the availability of injunctive relief. 
Any further actions that platforms may choose to take with synthetic media 
would be a private decision for the platform companies and not a requirement of 
law. The platforms, acting as private citizens, could choose to remove some or 
all altered videos, downgrade them, put them through additional review—or for 
that matter promote them however the platform prefers. The Supreme Court 
recently reaffirmed in Manhattan Community Access Corporation v. Halleck88 
that even regulated private television broadcasters are private actors, not state 
actors bound by the First Amendment. The point is that a truth-in-labeling law 
would not require the government to remove any content, and any removal 
choices would be private decisions not limited by the First Amendment. 
In this way, the deep fakes problem is surprisingly easier to solve (once the 
technology is in place) than the problem of low-tech false information. When it 
comes to whether video or audio has been manipulated, there is an objective 
 
 85. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 513–14 (2001). 
 86. Id. at 524. 
 87. At the time this Essay went to press, Twitter began voluntarily experimenting with labeling 
altered videos as “manipulated.” Cat Zakrzewski, Twitter Flags Video Retweeted by President 
Trump as ‘Manipulated Media,’ WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
technology/2020/03/08/twitter-flags-video-retweeted-by-president-trump-manipulated-media/ 
[https://perma.cc/EMA6-T8CA]. My proposal is also less intrusive than Professor Green’s, which 
“would impose criminal sanction for the knowing manufacture of fake images, audio or other 
material of an identifiable candidate for public office, published within [a specified number of] 
days prior to an election, with intent to deceive voters and distort the electoral process.” Green, 
supra note 34, at 1456. She would exempt counterfeit campaign speech clearly labeled as “fake.” 
Id. at 1457. 
 88. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1934 (2019). 
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truth of the matter: a scientific comparison of original content with content 
posted online. As noted above, it is much harder to use law to deal with false 
campaign speech, such as the outrageous claims made in the 2016 election that 
Hillary Clinton was a murderer89 or that Democrats were responsible for the 
murder of DNC staffer Seth Rich, a false claim suggested by Wikileaks to take 
the heat off the Russians for leaking DNC documents.90 A law that told 
platforms to remove factually false content would be much more difficult to 
enforce. Who decides what is true or false, and how? Mandating that platforms 
determine truth does not solve the First Amendment problem. For the problem 
of “mere” misinformation and not synthetic media, the best hope for now is not 
the use of election law but instead public pressure to force private social media 
platforms to police it. If the platforms do not respond to pressure, the next lever 
might be antitrust law to create smaller companies more responsive to consumer 
demand and pressure.91 
IV.  CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 
Alabama voters looking at Facebook for information about whom to support 
in the 2017 special election to replace Jeff Sessions for the United States Senate 
may well have come across the “Dry Alabama” website, which was backing 
Republican candidate Roy Moore against Democrat Doug Jones. The New York 
Times explained that the Facebook page,  
illustrated with stark images of car wrecks and videos of families ruined by 
drink, had a blunt message: Alcohol is the devil’s work, and the state should ban 
it entirely. Along with a companion Twitter feed, the Facebook page appeared 
to be the work of Baptist teetotalers who supported the Republican, Roy S. 
Moore, in the 2017 Alabama Senate race. “Pray for Roy Moore,” one tweet 
exhorted.92 
The teetotalers, however, were not behind the Dry Alabama page on 
Facebook and they did not support Moore. Instead, those behind the page 
“thought associating Mr. Moore with calls for a statewide alcohol ban would 
 
 89. Jeet Heer, Minutes, NEW REPUBLIC (June 27, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/minutes/13 
3694/donald-trump-suggests-hillary-clinton-might-murdererand-no-one-bats-eye [https://perma. 
cc/W68J-HUJS] (“Donald Trump suggests Hillary Clinton might be a murderer—and no one bats 
an eye.”) 
 90. See MUELLER REPORT, supra note 29, at 48–49. 
 91. There is a rigorous debate on the question of using antitrust law to break up social media 
companies, an issue beyond the scope of this Essay. See Jacob M. Schlesinger, Brent Kendall, & 
John D. McKinnon, Tech Giants Google, Facebook and Amazon Intensify Antitrust Debate, WALL 
ST. J. (June 12, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-giants-google-facebook-and-amazon-
intensify-antitrust-debate-11559966461 [https://perma.cc/4T3U-4MVP]. 
 92. Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, Democrats Faked Online Push to Outlaw Alcohol in Alabama 
Race, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/07/us/politics/alabama-senate 
-facebook-roy-moore.html [https://perma.cc/LAV4-7DND]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2020] DEEP FAKES, BOTS, AND SILOED JUSTICES 555 
hurt him with moderate, business-oriented Republicans and assist the Democrat, 
Doug Jones, who won the special election by a hair-thin margin.”93 
Nor were the scores of purportedly Russian bots with their Cyrillic names 
and symbols popping up on Twitter and supporting Roy Moore during the 
campaign actually from Russia. Instead, in a story I tell in greater detail 
elsewhere,94 a liberal group supporting Jones, working independently and 
apparently without his knowledge, engaged in a concentrated social media 
campaign to flip the votes of moderate Republicans, or at least get them to stay 
home and not vote at all in the normally deep red state. This was an unusual 
Democratic voter suppression effort in a red state aimed at white Republicans. 
“Project Alabama” was funded by billionaire LinkedIn cofounder, Reid 
Hoffman, through an outfit called American Engagement Technologies.95 Some 
of the political operation’s activities disseminated misinformation, but others 
involved circulation of truthful information or non-factual opinion, where the 
real chicanery was not in the content of the message but in lying about or 
obscuring the identity of the speaker.96 Alabama voters deciding who to vote for 
might well have cared that progressive Democrats, and not teetotalers or 
Russians, were the ones trying to influence who they voted for and how.  
But information about the source of the influence campaign was not 
available to voters when they voted. It came to light only after the election 
through leaks to the New York Times97 and Washington Post.98 Without those 
leaks, we still might not know of these efforts, just like we only learned of some 
of the Russian activity aimed at sowing social discord swinging the election to 
Donald Trump thanks to the work of American intelligence agencies and the 
prosecutors who produced the Mueller report.  
Campaign finance disclosure law has long been concerned with making sure 
busy voters have the information they need to make informed decisions. Social 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION MELTDOWN: DIRTY TRICKS, DISTRUST, AND THREAT TO 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 75–80 (2020). 
 95. Id. at 78–79. 
 96. Id. at 75–76. 
 97. Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, Secret Experiment in Alabama Senate Race Imitated Russian 
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/alabama-senate-roy 
-jones-russia.html [https://perma.cc/8WNA-LHXW]; Scott Shane, Alan Blinder, & Sydney Ember, 
Doug Jones “Outraged” by Russian-Style Tactics Used in His Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/doug-jones-social-media.html [https://per 
ma.cc/KEE6-N8A8]. 
 98. Craig Timberg, Tony Romm, Aaron C. Davis, & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Secret Campaign to 
Use Russian-Inspired Tactics in 2017 Ala. Election Stirs Anxiety for Democrats, WASH. POST (Jan. 
6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/secret-campaign-to-use-russian-
inspired-tactics-in-2017-alabama-election-stirs-anxiety-for-democrats/2019/01/06/58803f26-040 
0-11e9-8186-4ec26a485713_story.html?utm_term=.86cbec124752 [https://perma.cc/73SB-A7 
PS]. 
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science demonstrates that voters use shortcuts to make decisions, and one 
reliable piece of information voters rely upon is who is behind an election 
message aimed at them.99 For example, in 2010, California voters turned down 
a ballot proposition that would have benefited Pacific Gas and Electric 
(“PG&E”). PG&E provided almost all of the $46 million to the “Yes on 16” 
campaign, compared with very little spent opposing the measure. “Thanks to 
California’s disclosure laws, PG&E’s name appeared on every ‘Yes on 16’ ad, 
and the measure narrowly went down to defeat.”100 
The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo101 recognized that campaign finance 
disclosure laws may serve this information interest, as well as interests in 
preventing the corruption of elected officials, by allowing voters to follow the 
money and look for special treatment given to campaign donors or those who 
spend to favor or oppose candidates, and the enforcement interest, ensuring that 
no other campaign finance laws are broken. For example, it is illegal for foreign 
governments, other foreign entities, and most noncitizens (except green card 
holders residing in the United States) to spend money on American candidate 
campaigns,102 and adequate disclosure allows regulators, the press, and the 
public to ensure that prohibited foreign sources are not secretly participating in 
our elections. 
Our current campaign finance disclosure laws are not up to the task of 
ferreting out the true sources of new social media campaigns aimed at trying to 
influence opinions in elections, such as the activities of the Russians in 2016 or 
the pro-Jones forces in Alabama in 2017.  
Roughly speaking, federal campaign finance disclosure law requires the 
disclosure of spending by persons or entities who engage in express advocacy, 
such as an advertisement directly urging a vote for or against a candidate.103 The 
law also requires disclosure of some advertising appearing on television or radio 
which mentions or features a candidate in a small time window before the 
election.104 Candidates, political parties, and campaign committees also have to 
disclose their election-related spending.105 Courts have split over whether 
political organizations that have as a major purpose the election or defeat of 
 
 99. Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure 
Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295 (2005). 
 100. For more details on PG& E example, see Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense 
of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J. L. & POL. 557, 570 (2012). 
 101. 424 U.S. at 66–68. 
 102. 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2019); 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (2019). 
 103. Id. § 30101(9)(A). See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52 (defining express advocacy). 
 104. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1) (2019). 
 105. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101(9)(A), 30104 (2019). 
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candidates may constitutionally be compelled to disclose their expenses as 
well.106 
Unfortunately, these rules leave open a great deal of important campaign 
activity for which there is no compelled disclosure, making it impossible for law 
to fulfill its information, anticorruption, and enforcement purposes. 107 Most of 
the paid social media advertising that the Russians engaged in did not contain 
express advocacy. It likely would surprise non-specialists in the area, but 
spending money on online advertising saying “Hillary Clinton is a Satan!,” as 
Russian operatives did in 2016,108 is not considered campaign activity under 
federal campaign finance rules. And unless “Dry Alabama” registered as a 
political action committee, it too likely would have been able to avoid disclosing 
who paid for its activities unless it engaged in express advocacy. “Pray for Roy 
Moore” is not express advocacy.  
Campaign finance disclosure laws should be updated to deal with the 
changing campaign landscape, and in particular to deal with the use of social 
media and artificial intelligence to influence elections.  
First, Congress should extend the same rules that apply to television and 
radio advertisements to advertising distributed online, including via social 
media. Years ago, I was among those arguing that the Federal Election 
Commission’s failure to extend the rules to the online space would leave one of 
the most important arenas for campaigning unregulated and without adequate 
disclosure.109 But libertarian opposition to any regulation related to campaigns 
and the Internet has successfully beat back most efforts to extend the rules for 
almost two decades as the use of new technologies for campaigning has 
exploded.110 Had those nascent efforts succeeded, those who spend significant 
sums seeking to support or oppose candidates for office and who mention 
candidates’ names or feature their likenesses in online content would have had 
to comply with disclosure rules. Today, with so much campaign and political 
 
 106. Zachary R. Clark, Comment, Constitutional Limits on State Campaign Finance Disclosure 
Laws: What’s the Purpose of the Major Purpose Test?, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 527 (2015). 
 107. See Hasen, Cheap Speech, supra note 8, at 219 n.84 (describing narrow reach of foreign 
spending ban according to court decision in Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 
281, 292, aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012)). 
 108. See the indictment filed by Special Counsel Robert Mueller, Feb. 16, 2018, at page 20, 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download [https://perma.cc/3T8R-U2U3], for the “Hillary is 
a Satan!” example. 
 109. Richard L. Hasen, The Ripple Effects of the FEC’s Rules on Political Blogging: 
Why They Will End Up Undermining Limits on Corporation and Union Campaign Finance 
Activities, FINDLAW (Apr. 5, 2005), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/the-ripple-ef 
fects-of-the-fecs-rules-on-political-blogging.html [https://perma.cc/3WLA-9A7T]. 
 110. Ashley Balcerzak, Federal Officials Struggle to Drag Political Rules into the Internet Age, 
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 27, 2018) (corrected Oct. 26, 2018), https://publicintegrity.org/ 
federal-politics/federal-officials-struggle-to-drag-political-ad-rules-into-the-internet-age/ 
[https://perma.cc/7QJZ-UP6F]. 
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activity moving online, there is no good argument that government regulation 
which is generally applicable to campaign activity should not apply to online 
campaign activity. The world is topsy-turvy when online political activity 
requires the least disclosure but needs it the most. 
The proposed Honest Ads Act111 would close the loophole for traditional 
campaigns ads disseminated over social media and the Internet, but simply 
bringing the McCain-Feingold era disclosure laws on “electioneering 
communications” to social media will not be enough to deal with cutting-edge 
methods of influence. Today, campaigns and others use data harvested from a 
voter’s online activity to target ads aimed at that voter’s views and interests.112 
View the Audubon Society website? You might be hit with an advertisement 
criticizing or praising a candidate’s environmental record.  
Such microtargeting, which gained popularity in 2016, is no longer the 
cutting edge of campaign persuasion techniques. Already campaigns are 
experimenting with programmable non-human “bots” that send direct messages 
to users and engage in political conversations with these users in an effort to 
influence their voter choice. As Noam Cohen explained,  
When they were invented, back in the nineteen-sixties, they weren’t capable of 
manipulating their users. Most bot creators worked in university labs and didn’t 
conjure these programs to exploit the public. Today’s bots have been designed 
to achieve specific goals by appearing human and blending into the cacophony 
of online voices. Many have been commercialized or politicized. In the 2016 
Presidential campaign, bots were created to support both Donald Trump and 
Hillary Clinton, but pro-Trump bots outnumbered pro-Clinton ones five to one, 
by one estimate, and many were dispatched by Russian intermediaries.113  
Already California has passed a law to ban the practice of using anonymous 
bots.114 And it is impossible to know what technological innovations will next 
be harvested for campaign purposes. 
 
 111. S. 1356, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1 
356/text [https://perma.cc/Z64G-GV2Y]. 
 112. On the use of and concerns about campaigns engaging in microtargeting, see Persily, supra 
note 27, at 21–23. 
 113. Noam Cohen, Will California’s New Bot Law Strengthen Democracy?, THE NEW YORKER 
(July 2, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/will-californias-new-bot-
law-strengthen-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/X9FS-277E]. 
 114. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17941(a) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to use a 
bot to communicate or interact with another person in California online, with the intent to mislead 
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Second, modern campaign finance disclosure law should be updated so that 
it requires the disclosure of the funders behind coordinated and well-funded 
attempts to influence elections via social media, even if the attempted persuasion 
comes in the form of bot-generated private messages lacking express advocacy. 
The best estimate is that Russia spent around $100,000 on Facebook advertising 
aimed to influence the 2016 elections,115 out of billions spent during those 
elections, and the threshold for disclosure should be set low enough to capture 
this level of spending. 
An updated disclosure law should require that any person or entity who 
spends over a certain threshold on using social media resources to directly or 
indirectly influence voters to vote for or against a particular candidate or ballot 
measure must disclose the amount of their activities and their ultimate source of 
funding to the government via an online report. And to the extent technologically 
practicable,116 the message itself should provide an easy basis, such as the 
clicking of a link, to determine the identity of the sender (as well as further 
information about funding). 
The spending threshold for mandated disclosure would count not only the 
funds paid to the platforms for paid services but also expenditures using software 
engineers, consultants, or others in an effort to influence elections via social 
media.117 Those who fall within the reporting threshold would have to certify 
under penalty of perjury to the website or social media platform they wish to use 
that they have made the required disclosures to the government before they may 
use social media resources on the platform. The law would exempt those who 
can credibly demonstrate that they would face the threat of harassment if their 
identities were disclosed118 and media corporations when they are engaged in 
journalistic enterprises.119 
 
 115. Scott Shane & Vindu Goel, Fake Russian Facebook Accounts Bought $100,000 in 
Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/face 
book-russian-political-ads.html [https://perma.cc/4SMK-ZYEB]. 
 116. But cf. 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(f)(1) (exempting from disclosure “(i) Bumper stickers, pins, 
buttons, pens, and similar small items upon which the disclaimer cannot be conveniently printed 
[and] (ii) Skywriting, water towers, wearing apparel, or other means of displaying an advertisement 
of such a nature that the inclusion of a disclaimer would be impracticable”). 
 117. The law would not cover unpaid, non-targeted social media posts, such as that of an 
individual expressing support or opposition to a candidate. 
 118. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982). The Federal 
Election Commission has long determined when groups are entitled to such an exemption. See, e.g., 
Federal Election Commission, Advisory Op. 2016-23 (granting renewed partial disclosure 
exemption for Socialist Workers Party), https://www.fec.gov/updates/advisory-opinion-request-
2016-23-socialist-workers-party/ [https://perma.cc/W6DT-5D48]. 
 119. This of course raises the question of who counts as a journalist in the Internet and social 
media age. I address this question in detail in RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: 
CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 124–
45 (2016). My bottom line is to piggyback on a definition of journalism put forward by Professor 
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No doubt, opponents of an enhanced social media disclosure law would 
argue that such a law violates the First Amendment. I believe there are strong 
arguments in favor of the constitutionality of this disclosure under current 
Supreme Court doctrine, although I am concerned about the direction that the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area may go. 
Since the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo120 and through the 2010 case, 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,121 the Supreme Court has 
applied “exacting scrutiny” and upheld most disclosure laws challenged under 
the First Amendment. These laws do not prohibit any speech, but rather allow 
voters to know who is paying to influence their political decisions. They are a 
more narrowly tailored approach to the issue of money in politics than limits or 
bans on spending. With an exemption for those demonstrating the threat of 
harassment, disclosure laws generally pass constitutional muster. 
Although there have been twists and turns that I have covered elsewhere,122 
the Court has repeatedly held that the government’s anticorruption, information, 
and its enforcement interests can justify generally applicable campaign finance 
disclosure laws, even if they are targeted at very small contributions. Such laws 
are constitutional so long as they contain an exemption for those who may 
demonstrate a realistic threat of harassment.  
Federal election law requires disclosure of certain expenditures, and defines 
an expenditure to include “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, 
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the 
purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.”123 Current Federal 
Election Commission regulations exempt certain Internet-based activities from 
regulation.124 The federal statute and these regulations should be rewritten to 
ensure disclosure above a certain dollar threshold on Internet and social media 
efforts undertaken for the purpose of influencing federal elections. Disclosure 
should no longer be limited to those who spend money on express advocacy or 
who engage in electioneering communications. 
The question is how to write a law or regulation defining what counts as 
spending “for the purpose of influencing federal elections” without running 
afoul of vagueness and chilling problems under the First Amendment.125 
Fortunately, when it comes to disclosure, the Supreme Court has held that the 
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government may require disclosure of spending on political activity that goes 
well beyond express advocacy for elections. Thus, in the 1954 case of United 
States v. Harriss,126 the Supreme Court upheld a law mandating the disclosure 
of certain lobbying activities. In the 1978 case, First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti,127 the Court upheld campaign finance disclosure requirements 
applicable to ballot measure campaigns, with no involvement of candidates.  
Further, in Citizens United, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
the government could only require disclosure of spending on express advocacy 
and its functional equivalent.128 And in a portion of the earlier McConnell case 
not overruled by Citizens United, the Court upheld Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act Section 504’s broad “issue request” requirement, requiring broadcasters to 
keep records of requests made by anyone to broadcast “message[s]” related to a 
“national legislative issue of public importance” or “otherwise relating to a 
political matter of national importance.”129 Writing for a Court majority on this 
point, Justice Breyer’s opinion  
explained a number of purposes served by the section 504 recordkeeping 
requirements, including that “recordkeeping can help both the regulatory 
agencies and the public evaluate broadcast fairness, and determine the amount 
of money that individuals or groups, supporters or opponents, intend to spend to 
help elect a particular candidate.” He recognized that the “issue request” 
requirements could impose an administrative burden, and left open the 
possibility of a challenge to FCC implementing regulations in the future.130 
Given these precedents, a law targeted at the disclosure of social media 
expenditures made with a purpose of influencing federal elections should pass 
constitutional muster, even if it reaches more broadly than express advocacy, for 
example to cover large spending on political issues related to the election by 
groups such as those aligned with the Tea Party Movement or Black Lives 
Matter. The disclosure rule should rely on clear factors for determining what 
counts as election-related spending subject to disclosure, tied to both content and 
timing, modeled after the clarity of FEC rules determining what counts as a 
“coordinated communication.”131 Clear rules avoid the potential for vagueness 
and administrative and prosecutorial discretion in the application of these rules. 
Although I am confident of the constitutionality of such a measure under 
existing Supreme Court doctrine, the Court’s jurisprudence on disclosure will 
not necessarily remain static. Justices Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia 
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were great proponents among conservatives of the value of campaign disclosure 
laws,132 but they no longer are on the Court. Justice Clarence Thomas has long 
held the view that there is a general right to anonymity when engaging in 
campaign activity,133 a view the Court flirted with in a 1995 case called McIntyre 
v. Ohio Election Commission134 but later all but abandoned. Further, in Doe v. 
Reed,135 both Justices Thomas136 and Samuel Alito137 expressed concern about 
the greater potential for harassment of campaign donors given the ease with 
which information about contributors and spenders flows on the Internet, an 
issue which seems in recent years to have broken along ideological lines, with 
conservatives expressing greater concern about harassment. These views could 
well attract the support of the newest Justices, Neil Gorsuch and Brett 
Kavanaugh, leaving Chief Justice Roberts in the middle.  
In short, my proposed disclosure law is likely constitutional under current 
doctrine (with the longer-term future less certain). Such a law could help voters 
obtain valuable information about who is trying to influence their votes. It could 
also help with the enforcement interest by making sure that prohibited foreign 
sources are not engaged in illegal activities to influence our elections.138 And it 
is likely to be much more effective than private efforts to require disclosure. 
Facebook’s efforts have been both overinclusive, including journalists who 
should be exempt from disclosure,139 and underinclusive, by allowing people to 
hide their true identities behind other persons or entities, such as Vice News’s 
successful efforts to pretend to be all 100 U.S. Senators and to post ads in their 
name.140 
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The law would not be perfect. Efforts to sow discord, for example, by 
organizing pro- and anti-Muslim rallies on facing street corners as Russian 
govern operatives did in the 2016 elections,141 might be revealed only if a social 
media platform looked closely enough at the activities, flagged the spenders as 
engaging in these activities for the purpose of influencing U.S. elections, and 
excluded them for not filling a certification. But to the extent actors would use 
social media platforms for campaign purposes, the certification requirement will 
create the right legal incentives for the platforms to look for such activity and 
improve disclosure. 
V.  VOTING RIGHTS AND SILOED JUSTICES142 
In an eye-opening 2013 interview with journalist Jennifer Senior, the late 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia explained his “media diet.”143 He said 
that he read the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Times.144 He had 
dropped his subscription to the Washington Post because of what he saw as the 
newspaper’s “treatment of almost any conservative issue. It was slanted and 
often nasty. And, you know, why should I get upset every morning? I don’t think 
I’m the only one. I think they lost subscriptions partly because they became so 
shrilly, shrilly liberal.”145 He also said he did not read the New York Times and 
that he got most of his news from talk radio.146 
Scalia’s media diet was a sign of things to come, and raises perhaps the most 
difficult issue for election law in the post-truth era: how should we deal with 
judges and Supreme Court justices who cannot agree on basic facts about the 
state of the political world? 
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In their recent book on Supreme Court decision-making,147 Neal Devins and 
Larry Baum argue that the two leading political science models of Supreme 
Court judicial decision-making—the attitudinalist model positing that Justices 
vote their values and the strategic model positing that Justices vote strategically 
to advance their values in light of the potential reactions of other strategic actors, 
such as Congress and executive agencies—inadequately describe the Justices’ 
decision-making. They instead offer a psychological model positing that 
Justices, like others, are the product of the world around them, and Supreme 
Court Justices traveling in elite social circles seek affirmation and approval from 
these elites. 
As the authors tell it, in an earlier era, a common social circle of other 
judges, law professors, lawyers at the top of the profession, and journalists at 
elite news outlets helped shape the Justices’ values and occasionally rein in their 
votes, and that given an historic liberal bent of the legal elite (at least on civil 
rights and civil liberties issues), many Justices “evolved” over time toward the 
left on these issues.148 The authors wrote of the so-called “Greenhouse effect” 
where even some conservative Justices were swayed by coverage of the Court 
and its decisions by the New York Times’s former Supreme Court reporter, Linda 
Greenhouse.149 
But polarization has changed everything on the Supreme Court. Thanks to 
polarization in Congress and the Presidency, for the first time in Supreme Court 
history all of the conservative-leaning Justices have been appointed by 
Presidents of one party and all the liberal-leaning Justices appointed by 
Presidents of the other party.150 The most conservative Democratic-appointed 
Justice is more liberal than the most liberal Republican-appointed Justice.151 
Today’s politically polarized elite world both shapes and reflects how 
Justices view their jobs and decide how to vote, leading to a new polarization on 
the Supreme Court. Adam Bonica and Maya Sen’s work152 confirms that the 
leftward drift of lawyers overall is accelerating, giving plenty of affirmation for 
the liberal Justices on the Court. At the same time, the ascendancy of 
conservatives and libertarians in the Federalist Society has created an alternative 
set of elite actors to whom conservative Justices on the Supreme Court can look 
for ideas, law clerks, and social affirmation.153 Lower court judges brought up 
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from Federalist Society ranks appointed by Republican Presidents frequently 
advance theories which the (liberal-leaning) legal elite would have considered 
“off the wall” in an earlier era,154 and reinforce one another as to the legitimacy 
of these new views. 
This divide means fewer “evolving” Justices and greater division on the 
Court over time, with social and political issues from abortion to voting rights 
to the environment increasingly likely to follow the predictable lines one would 
expect if the Justices were voting their political and ideological orientations. 
Ironically, the attitudinalist model will increasingly look right because the 
Justices can more fully vote their values with knowledge of affirmation from 
their reflective social circles. 
Devins and Baum have successfully captured the real phenomenon of 
polarization on the Supreme Court, even as the Court in its less ideological 
moments has achieved high rates of unanimity when the Court deals with 
enforcing uniformity of decision-making in the lower courts on non-ideological 
questions.155 When it is an issue that makes it to the front of the New York Times, 
the Justices will frequently now divide by ideology and party. 
The divide has been accelerated by the rise of the “Celebrity Justice,”156 a 
phenomenon exacerbated by social media. Justice Antonin Scalia, and later Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, became rock star Justices, drawing adoring crowds who 
celebrate these lawyers as though they were teenagers meeting Beyoncé.157 If 
we are thinking about the psychological effects on Justices getting affirmation 
that they are on the right path, cult-like worship can only make the assured even 
surer in their convictions. This seems especially dangerous during polarized 
times. 
This moment of polarization could not come at a worse time. We are 
experiencing rapid technological change in which social media amplifies and 
reinforces existing ideas, and where people get exposed to information from 
increasingly siloed sources.158 The Justices are not going to be immune from this 
phenomenon. 
So imagine a Federalist Society-oriented Justice getting bombarded at home 
and in the car and while listening to podcasts at the gym with talk of a scourge 
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of “voter fraud” via FOX News, Breitbart, and Twitter, while a liberal Justice 
hears constant messages about the “myth of voter fraud” and attempts at voter 
suppression from the New York Times, MSNBC, and the like.  
The Justices live in the real, and polarized, contemporary United States. It 
is worth a pause to note that one of the Justices’ spouses frequently touts 
unsupported voter fraud claims on social media and considered actions at polling 
places aimed at stopping purported non-citizen voter fraud.159 This certainly 
must affect this Justice’s world views of the facts at issue. 
When a case makes its way to the Supreme Court involving a restrictive 
voting law, the Justices come from their silos with different prior beliefs based 
upon how news has been presented to them, along with a set of legal precedents 
and presumptions which reinforce their own world views. 
Facts should matter to these Justices, as facts always should matter when 
courts decide cases of social and political importance. But in an increasingly 
post-fact society, where political tribalism rules and is amplified by social 
media, and Justices are the product of the world around them, what hope do we 
have for reasoned deliberation and rational decision-making? Very little, as the 
already frayed line between law and politics stands ready to collapse. 
CONCLUSION 
The convergence of technology and hyperpolarization raise new risks to our 
democracy. I have tried to demonstrate that election law can help in some 
regards, such as through improved campaign truth-in-labeling requirements to 
deal with deep fakes and with improved campaign finance disclosure laws. Both 
types of laws would help voters become more informed in making campaign 
choices and give them a better sense of who is trying to sway their opinion, and 
how. And they could do so without interfering with robust political campaigns 
required by the First Amendment and desirable for an advanced democracy. 
But the law can only do so much. As society divides on fundamental 
questions of truth, it becomes harder for everyone, including judges, to make 
rational decisions and accept data coming from outside informational cocoons. 
On this point, there seems little that can be done to prevent such divides, other 
than trying to pick the most open-minded judges possible. 
I end this exploration of American election law in a post-truth world by 
briefly mentioning an even larger issue, raising the final question I noted at the 
beginning of this essay: Will voters on the losing end of a close election trust 
vote totals and election results announced by election officials when voters are 
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bombarded with conspiracy theories about the reliability of voting technology 
and when foreign adversaries target voting systems to undermine confidence? 
I have devoted an entire book to this topic,160 and, to cut to the chase, I am 
not optimistic. Democracies depend upon election losers accepting election 
results and believing that the vote totals announced by election officials 
accurately represent the reality of the situation: that the winner of the election 
got more votes than the loser, or at least appeared to do so given the state of our 
election system. 
Election scholars’ primary task should be to think about how to update 
election laws and procedures in the post-truth era to assure continued peaceful 
transitions of power. People are going to be skeptical, especially when they are 
on the losing end of elections. Transparency and clarity are the best tools to build 
into law and into election processes. Transparency and clarity will not convince 
all skeptics. But in their absence, the volatile combination of hyperpolarization 
and social media wildfires threatens the bedrock of democracy itself: confidence 
in free and fair elections. 
We owe future generations our best efforts to craft election laws recognizing 
the challenges that profound technological change during a period of 
hyperpolarization pose for our great democracy. 
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